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Abstract
Concerns about climate change are growing, and so is the demand for information about the
costs and benefits of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. This paper seeks to estimate the
benefits of climate change mitigation, as measured by the public’s willingness to pay for such
policies. We investigate the preferences of Italian and Czech households towards climate change
mitigation policy options directly related to residential energy use. We use discrete choice
experiments, which are administered in a standardized fashion to representative samples in the
two countries through computer-assisted web interviews. The willingness to pay per ton of CO2
emissions avoided is €132 Euro for the Italians and 94 Euro for the Czech respondents (at 2014
purchasing power parity). We find evidence of considerable heterogeneity in WTP driven by
income. The two samples differ in their “domestic” income elasticities of WTP, but comparison
across the two countries suggests an income elasticity of WTP of one.
Keywords: Energy-efficiency incentives; Stated preferences; CO2 emissions reductions; CO2
mitigation policies, conjoint choice experiments, WTP for CO2 emissions reductions.
JEL Classification: Q41 (Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices); Q48 (Energy: Government
Policy); Q54 (Climate; Natural Disasters; Global Warming); Q51 (Valuation of Environmental
Effects).
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1 Introduction
Growing concerns about climate change (IPCC, 2007; IPCC, 2014) have spurred efforts
to estimate the benefits of greenhouse gas emissions mitigation strategies (e.g., Nordhaus 1994,
2007; Tol 2005; Stern 2007; Agrawala et. al. 2011). One approach to estimating such benefits is
to list all of the possible physical and economy-wide effects of climate change, attach a monetary
value to each of them, discount them to the present, and then compute the sum of such values
(Nordhaus 1994). Alternatively, one may use variation in temperatures across locales and over
time and use regression analyses to infer losses or gains to society (Mendelsohn et al. 2000).2
Finally, one could simply ask the beneficiaries of the mitigation policies to state their willingness
to pay for them.
Any one of these three approaches can be summarized into a figure known as the social
cost of carbon (SCC), i.e. the dollar value of reduced climate change damages associated with a
one-metric-ton reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (Pizer et al. 2014). When the first or
second of the approaches listed above are used, computing the SCC generally requires integrated
assessment models that make assumptions about future population growth, economic activity and
technology, and link the associated greenhouse gas emissions with their effects on climate
(Greenstone et al., 2013).
Tol (2013) provides an exhaustive survey of the literature on the damages of climate
change. Tol’s meta-analysis spans over 588 estimates from 75 published studies, finding that
“The mean estimate in these studies is a marginal cost of carbon of $196 per metric ton of carbon
(tC), but the modal estimate is only $49/tC. Of course, this divergence suggests that the mean
estimate is driven by some very large estimates.” Converting these figures from carbon to CO 2
yields a modal value of 13.36$/tCO2, while the mean is 53.45$/tCO2 (1995 US$).
2

Tol (2013) terms the latter the “statistical” approach, and the former the “enumerative” approach.

3
Studies that have used stated preference methods to elicit the public’s willingness to pay
for mitigation policies include Berk and Fovell (1999), Roe et al. (2001), Berrens et al. (2004),
Li et al. (2004), Li et al. (2005), Nomura and Akai (2004), Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2006),
Löschel et al. (2010), Löschel et al. (2013), and Diederich and Goeschl (2014). Tol (2013)
reviews many of these and other studies, and concludes that the amount of money that people
appear to be prepared to pay for carbon taxes is in line with its estimates based on the other
approaches: The WTP per metric ton of CO2 emissions reductions from stated preference studies
ranges from a few to a few thousand dollars (or Euro) per ton.
In this paper, we follow the stated preference approach based on choice experiments to
estimate the WTP per ton of CO2 emissions reduced. We ask three research questions. First, how
much would people say that they would be prepared to pay for each ton of CO2 emissions
reductions? Second, are the responses to hypothetical questions, and the WTP per ton that they
imply, reasonable, and how do they compare with their counterparts from earlier statedpreference studies or from damage-function based approaches? Third, how does such WTP per
ton vary with income?
We use discrete choice experiments, which we administer in a standardized fashion to
two samples of respondents—one in Italy and one in the Czech Republic. Unlike earlier studies
that elicited the additional price one would be prepared to pay to reduce emissions from a given
product traded in the market (e.g., airline travel, see Brouwer et al. 2008, or MacKerron et al.
2009, or cars, see Achtnicht 2009), we focus on public policies. Our context is energy use in
buildings, and more specifically dwellings, and, unlike Longo et al. (2008) and Longo et al.
(2012), we clearly specify the baseline annual emissions that the average household can expect
to generate through the use of electricity, gas and other fuels at home.
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Using the responses to the discrete choice experiments and the coefficients from the
associated conditional logit models, we estimate the willingness to pay per ton of CO2 emissions
avoided to be €133 – 164 2014 PPS Euro for the Italians and 94 2014 PPS Euro for the Czech
respondents. These figures are reasonable when compared with the WTP per ton from other
stated preference surveys (which vary between six and thousands of Euro per ton) and with other
approaches to estimating the social cost of carbon.
Moreover, our respondents appeared to trade off the attributes of the alternative policies
they were to choose from in ways that are consistent with economic theory, and indicated that
developing energy from renewables is more desirable than improving energy efficiency, and that
carbon taxes are undesirable. This result is in contrast with a recent survey in the US, which
indicated that at least 57% of the respondents were willing to pay a $1 fee on top of their utility
bill to support a carbon tax policy (Greenstone, 2016).
In addition, we examine how WTP per ton of CO2 emissions varies with the respondent’s
income. We specify models that let the marginal utility of emissions reductions, and the income
elasticity of the WTP for each ton of CO2, depend on income, without restricting to be below or
above one.
We find that there is significant heterogeneity in the WTP per ton of CO2 emissions
reductions and in the income elasticity of WTP, this heterogeneity being driven by income. The
mean income elasticity in each sample is less than one, and the Czech Republic exhibits low
income elasticities—on average 0.35 in one specification and 0.46 in another. (A third and more
flexible specification suggests an even lower elasticity of 0.22.) This result is explained in part
by the fact that in the Czech Republic the marginal utility of emissions reductions grows weakly
with income, and the marginal utility of income is actually greater among wealthier respondents.
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This low “domestic” income elasticity is in sharp contrast with the income elasticity of WTP
implied by the comparison of the two countries’ WTP, which is one.
These results can be placed in the context of practices followed in many studies, policy
analyses and some integrated assessment models, which assume a constant income elasticity of
WTP of one (Pearce 2006; Ready and Navrud 2006; Lindhjem and Navrud 2015). This means
that if information about WTP is available at location A but not at location B, B’s WTP can be
predicted as A’s WTP times the ratio of B’s and A’s income. In stated preference studies about
environmental quality and health improvements, however, the income elasticity of WTP is
typically less than one (Kristrőm and Riera 1996; Jacobsen and Hanley 2009; Czajkowski and
Ščasný 2010; OECD 2012). Our models, which allow for the income elasticity to depend on
income, is consistent with Czajkowski and Ščasný (2010) and Barbier et al (2016), who show
that the income elasticity of the WTP for a marginal reduction in pollution is only constant under
very restrictive assumptions and is most likely increasing in income.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our choice
experiments, the questionnaire and the administration of the survey. Section 3 lays out the
statistical model of the responses to the choice questions. Section 4 presents the data and section
5 the estimation results. Concluding remarks are offered in section 6.

2. Choice Experiments, Structure of the Questionnaire and Survey Administration
A. Choice Experiments to Understand Preferences for Policies
We study the public’s preferences for policies seeking to reduce CO2 emissions using a
survey-based approach, namely stated-preference choice experiments. In conjoint choice
experiments, study participants are asked to indicate which one they prefer out of a set of K
alternatives, usually goods or policy packages, where K2. The alternatives are defined by a
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finite set of attributes whose levels differ across alternatives. Respondents are usually asked to
engage in several such choice tasks within one survey instrument in hope of collecting more
information about preferences for any given number of completed questionnaires.
In our choice experiments, the alternatives are policy packages described by four
attributes: i) the goal of the policy, i.e., addressing energy efficiency or promoting renewable
energy; ii) the policy mechanism(s) (which may entail one or more of the following: incentives,
taxes on fossil fuels, standards, or information); iii) the reduction in CO2 emissions per
household, expressed both in tons and as percentage reduction with respect to the current
emissions, and iv) the cost of the policy to the respondent’s household. Items iii) and iv) are
expressed as per year for each of 10 years.
We included attribute iii) and iv) because they are essential for computing the WTP per
ton of CO2, our key research question. Unlike Longo et al. (2012), who focus on percentage
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions with respect to national levels, we focus on householdlevel emissions associated with residential energy use, and specify the reductions in both tons
and as a percentage of the baseline.
We included attributes i) and ii) because we are interested in assessing whether people
care about how emissions reductions are delivered, and earlier research on this issue is limited.
Some studies have found that people generally tend to prefer policy instruments resulting in
lower prices of environmentally friendly products and services (e.g. subsidies for renewable
energy sources) over instruments that increase the prices of environmentally harmful goods (see
Schade and Schlag, 2003; Eriksson et al., 2006). A policy instruments labelled as “tax” is found
to be significantly less acceptable than an unlabelled policy instrument, even when they have the
same characteristics (Brännlund and Persson, 2013; Cole and Brännlund, 2009; Kallbekken et al.
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2010, 2011). Respondents that are opposed to taxes may, however, be mollified by policies that
propose to recycle the revenue from those taxes into environmentally-oriented measures, such as
support for public transport and alternative means of transportation, development of clean
technologies, etc. (Saelen and Kallbekken, 2011).
In each choice question, respondents were asked to choose between two hypothetical
policies and the status quo, and so in our survey K=3. Attributes and attribute levels are
summarized in table 1. We told respondents that the CO2 emissions associated with home
electricity and heating fuel usage come to a total of 5 tons a year for the average Italian (or
Czech) household. Our hypothetical policies would deliver reductions in emissions of 5, 10, 20
and 33% with respect to this baseline, which correspond to 0.25, 0.5, 1, and 1.65 ton CO2 per
year, respectively. The cost amounts were selected so as to cover a broad range of possible
willingness to pay figures per ton of CO2 emissions reductions (14 – 1200 Euro per ton). The
current situation (status quo) was clearly presented to the respondent as delivering no emissions
reductions at zero additional cost to the respondent’s household.

B. The Valuation Section of the Questionnaire
Prior to administering the choice experiment questions, we provided general information
about public programs designed to reduce emissions of CO2 from homes and buildings. The
respondents were told that two major approaches to reducing CO2 emissions from homes and
buildings are possible. One is to improve energy efficiency, and the other is increasing the share
of renewable energy. Respondents were reminded of other benefits of these approaches,
including savings for the consumers, improved energy security, and others.
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We then told respondents that we would be asking them to indicate their preferences for
policies that attempt to reduce CO2 emissions, and that these policies would be described in a
stylized fashion by the four attributes listed in section 2.A. In each discrete choice task, the
respondents were asked to choose between policy A, policy B and the status quo. Choosing the
status quo implied no additional taxes or costs to the household, and no reductions in the current
level of CO2 emissions. A sample choice card is displayed in figure 1.
Respondents engaged in a total of five such choice tasks, then moved on to a series of
debriefing questions. These were followed by a number of questions meant to assess the
respondent’s beliefs and information about climate change and to measure his or her energy
literacy.

C. Questionnaire and Survey Administration
For both Italy and the Czech Republic, the choice experiments, the debriefing questions
and the climate change belief questions were placed roughly in the middle of the questionnaire.
The questionnaire ended with the usual questions about socio-demographics (family status,
education, income, etc.).
The front-end of the questionnaire was slightly different across the two countries. In
Italy, it focused on eliciting information about energy use and recent energy-efficiency upgrades
in the respondent’s home, while the Czech survey’s emphasis was on recent or planned
purchases of electric appliances such as refrigerators and washing machines. The design of the
choice experiments was identical across the two surveys.
In Italy, the questionnaire was self-administered using computer-assisted web
interviewing (CAWI) by a total of 1005 respondents recruited from the population that owns and
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resides in homes built before or in 2000. We focused on this segment of the population (roughly
84% of the entire population of Italy) because we were interested in energy-efficiency upgrades
and retrofits, and these typically happen when a home is sufficiently old. About one-third of the
sample had done one or more such retrofits within the last 5 years, one-third 5-15 years prior to
the survey, and the remaining one-third none whatsoever. The Italy survey was conducted in July
2014.
The Czech survey was conducted using CAWI in August and September 2014. The
Czech sample was comprised of persons recruited from the panel of consumers maintained by a
Czech survey firm, and was representative of the Czech population in terms of geography, age,
gender, education and income. We received a total of 1385 completed questionnaires.

3. The Model
We posit that the responses to the conjoint choice questions are driven by a random
utility model (RUM), where the indirect utility V from an alternative depends on the attributes
of that alternative. Formally, we assume that
(1)

Vij  1  G ij   2  Mij   3  CO2ij    ( y  Cij )

where G is a vector of dummies denoting the goal of the policy (to promote energy efficiency or
renewables as a way to reduce CO2 emissions), M is a vector of dummies denoting the specific
mechanisms used by the policy (e.g., fossil fuel taxes, incentives, etc.), CO2 is the CO2
emissions reduction per household delivered by the policy (in tons per year), y is the
respondent’s income and C is the cost of the program to the respondent’s household. In equation
(1), subscripts i and j denote the individual and the alternative, respectively, the s are the
marginal utilities and β is the marginal utility of income.
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For simplicity, let xj denote the attributes of alternative j other than its cost and  the
vector of their coefficients in equation (1). On appending an i.i.d. standard type I extreme value
error term, :
(2)

V j  x jα   ( y  C j )   j  V j   j ,

it can be shown that the probability that alternative k is chosen is
3

(3)

Pr(k )  exp(Vk ) /  exp(V j ) ,
j 1

which is the contribution to the likelihood in a conditional logit model (see Train, 2003).
When a respondent is asked to examine T choice cards, the log likelihood function is
(4)

N T
3

log L   yitk  ln  exp(Vitk )
i 1 t 1 k 1


3

 exp(V
j 1

itj


)  .


where yitk is a binary indicator denoting whether respondent i selects option k in choice exercise
t. Coefficients  and  are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. The willingness to
pay for a marginal change in the level of attribute m is obtained as ˆ m / ˆ , where the “hats”
denote the maximum likelihood estimates. In practice,  is estimated by entering only cost,
rather than residual income (y-C), in the model, so that the estimation routine produces the
negative of  as the coefficient on cost.
Based on equations (1)-(4), we derive the willingness to pay for each ton of CO2
emissions avoided as ˆ 3 / ˆ . We interpret this as the “pure” willingness to pay per ton, after
controlling for other policy attributes that may make one or the other policy more or less
attractive to the respondents.
To examine interactions of policy instruments (for example, whether people are less
strongly opposed to the carbon tax when incentives are also used), we amend equation (1) so that
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M contains dummies with the four base policy instruments and the interactions of the carbon tax
dummy with the other policy instruments. To study the income elasticity of the WTP per ton of
CO2 emissions reduced, we specify the following random utility model:

Vij  1  G ij   2  M ij   3   1  HINCi   CO2 ij 

(5)





 1  1  QRT1i   2  QRT 4i  3  MISSINC i  ( y  Cij )
where HINC is recoded household income, and MISSINC is a dummy that takes on a value of
one if the respondent declined to report income,3 QRT1 denotes that the households falls in the
first quartile of the sample distribution of income and QRT4 in the upper 25%. Equation (5)
allows the marginal utility of emissions reductions to change linearly with household income (if
reported by the respondent), and places the marginal utility of income in four discrete groups—
that for persons that did not report income, that for persons at the bottom 25% of the distribution
of income, that for persons at the top 25% of the distribution of income, and that for everyone
else.4
If a household falls in the bottom 25% of the distribution of income in the sample, then
its WTP per ton is

WTP equal to

 3  1 * HINC
, while one in the top 25% of the distribution of income has
1  1

   1 * HINC
 3  1 * HINC
3
. All other households’ WTP is 3
, but
if
1   3
1   2
1

they fail to report their income.
It is straightforward to show that the income elasticity of the WTP per ton of CO2 is

3

When someone does not report his or her income, the recoded household income variable is zero and the missing
income dummy MISSINC is equal to one. If someone does report income, then HINC is equal to the actual income
amount and MISSINC is zero.
4
Equation (5) is simplified to equation (1) if all s and s are equal to zero.
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 1 * HINC
,
 3   1 * HINC

(6)

and thus that it depends on income, as long as the household reports income. It is not possible to
compute the income elasticity of WTP for those households that do not report their income in the
questionnaire.
We expect the WTP per ton of CO2 emissions reduced to increase with income. In other
words, we expect 1 to be positive, 1 to be non-negative (poorer persons have greater or no
smaller marginal utility of income) and 2  0 (the wealthiest persons have lower marginal
utility of income). If these expectations are borne out in the data, one implication is that the
income elasticity of WTP per ton tends to one when income grows and to zero when income
becomes very small.
To allow for different patterns of income elasticity of WTP, we estimate variants of RUM
(5) where let the marginal utility of CO2 emissions reductions to be quadratic in income:
(7)





Vij  1  G ij   2  Mij   3  1  HINCi   2  HINCSQ i  CO2ij 





 1  1  QRT1i   2  QRT 4i  3  MISSINC i  ( y  Cij )
where HINCSQ is the square of household income. The income of elasticity of WTP per ton
associated with this indirect utility is
(8)

1 * HINC  2 2 * HINCSQ
.
 3  1 * HINC   2 * HINCSQ

Depending on the values of the coefficients, the income elasticity of WTP per ton can reach and
exceed one.

4. The Data
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Descriptive statistics of the respondents in each country are reported in table 2. The
Czech sample is even in terms of gender, whereas males account for some 61% of the Italian
sample. Even more important, the Czech and the Italy sample differ in terms of respondent
educational attainment. Over a third of the respondents have a college or post-graduate degree in
the Italy sample, but in the Czech sample this share is only about 14%, which mirrors the share
in the general population of that country.5 The Italian respondents are also more likely to have
completed high school than their Czech counterparts (48% v. 36%, respectively).
Respondent education alone can explain why people place a different value on CO2
emissions reductions. In this paper, however, we focus on the impact of income, and these
differences in educational attainment are subsumed into the two samples’ income levels.
Regressions of household income on educational attainment dummies show a monotonic and
significant relationship between them. This is the case in both Italy and the Czech Republic
(results available from the authors).
About 10.6% of the Czech and 12.5% of the Italian respondents decline to report their
income. On average, monthly net household income is 27,739 CZK or 1,696 PPS Euro (20,352
PPS Euro annual) for those Czech respondents who do report their incomes. Their Italian
counterparts reported an average of 30,185 Euro/year (30,789 Euro PPS/year). These figures are
reasonably similar to the national averages.6
When asked about their preferences for mitigation policies, it is reasonable to expect that
people’s stated-preference responses should be affected by their knowledge of climate change
and concern about it. The shares of the sample ratings about climate change are displayed in
5

By contrast, population statistics from Italy indicate that only 12.30% of the population has a university degree and
that about 29% has a high school diploma. Our Italy sample thus over-represents highly educated adults.
6
In the 2014 Consumer Expenditure Survey, the average net household income was 30,489 CZK in the Czech
Republic. Banca d’Italia (2015) reports that in 2014 the average after tax household income in 2014 was 30,500
Euro (see https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/indagine-famiglie/bil-fam2014/suppl_64_15.pdf).
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table 3. Panel (A) of this table, which refers to the Italy sample, suggests that most of the Italian
respondents have heard of climate change before and that very few dispute its existence.
However, the first two rows of table 3, panel (A), suggest that there is some degree of confusion
about ozone layer depletion and climate change. The distribution of the responses provided by
the Czech respondents, shown in table 3, panel (B), is qualitatively similar, except that perhaps
the Czech respondents are somewhat more agnostic, as suggested by the larger shares of
“neutral” ratings.
Again, these differences between the two samples are subsumed into the two samples’
incomes. Ordinal logit regressions of the ratings of statements G2_2 (“Climate change is caused
by excessive GHG emissions”), G2_4 (“CO2 is one of the most important GHG”), G2_6
“”Climate change doesn’t exist”) and G2_8 (“I have never heard of climate change before”)
suggest that the higher household income, the more likely is the respondent to agree with these
statements (when correct), disagree that climate change doesn’t exist, and reject the notion that
he or she has never heard of climate change before.
As shown in table 4, the responses to the policy choice questions appear to be reasonable:
About 40% of the Italy survey respondents selected program A, 37% program B, and 23% opted
for the status quo. The Czech shares are, in order, 33%, 36% and almost 31%. Clearly, the Czech
respondents choose the current situation more often than the Italians, implying that their WTP
for the policy packages should be lower. Table 5 shows that the responses are stable over the
choice exercises, and that there is no obvious evidence of anomalies or unusual response
patterns. This is the case for both the Italy and the Czech Republic respondents.
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5. Results
A. Italy
We fit the conditional logit models of section 3 separately for the Italy and Czech
Republic samples, and report the results in table 6. For good measure, the standard errors are
clustered at the individual level, since we expect responses provided by the same subject to be
potentially correlated.
The results from the Italy sample are reasonable and suggest that individuals were
correctly trading off the attributes of the policies when selecting their most preferred ones. The
status quo is the omitted category, and thus the positive and significant coefficients on the energy
efficiency and renewables dummies indicate that these policies were generally preferred over the
status quo.
The coefficient on the renewables dummy is greater than the one on the energy efficiency
goal dummy, and a Wald test indicates that they are significantly different from one another at
the conventional significance levels (Wald statistic: 23.31, p value less than 0.00001). It is
possible that respondents failed to grasp the possible role of energy efficiency in reducing energy
consumption and hence emissions, despite our effort in drafting the policy background material
in the questionnaire. Alternatively, they may simply have a preference for renewables, because
they appear more environmentally friendly than other options.
Our survey respondents also have a preference for incentives over other implementation
options. The coefficient on fossil fuel taxes is negative and significant, and similar in absolute
magnitude to those on energy efficiency standards and information-based approaches, but the
latter two are statistically significant only at the 11% and 8% levels, respectively. Combining the
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fossil fuel tax with incentives, standards or information campaign does little to improve the
appeal of such a tax (results available from the authors).
The larger the CO2 emissions reductions delivered by the program, the more likely a
respondent to choose that policy. The coefficient on CO2 emissions reductions is positive and
statistically significant at the conventional levels, which means that the responses to the choice
tasks are sensitive to “scope” (Carson, 2012, p. 17 and others) and consistent with economic
theory.7 The lower the cost, the more attractive the policy, all else the same. Both of these effects
are strongly statistically significant at the conventional levels. The willingness to pay for each
ton of CO2 emissions avoided is a very reasonable €130.21 (standard error €14.02).8
Table 7, panel (A), shows the results of the conditional logit that lets the marginal utility
of the emissions reductions vary with income, but keeps the marginal utility of income constant
with respect to income (i.e., the RUM in equation (5) with all  coefficients set to zero). This
table provides some initial evidence of heterogeneity in the WTP per ton of CO2. As summarized
in table 9, the WTP per ton is only 31.48 € (s.e. 23.37) when someone does not report his or her
household income, and 144.01 € (s.e. 15.54) when they do. The WTP is 83.76 € (s.e. 15.77) for
those with income in the bottom 25% of the distribution of income in the sample and 181.22 €
(s.e. 8.88) for those in the top 25%. The income elasticity of the WTP per ton ranges from 0.54
to 0.90, for an average of 0.74 (table 7).
We report the results from the full RUM of equation (5) in table 7, panel (B). The
marginal utility of emissions reductions does increase significantly with household income, but
the marginal utility of income is different only for the respondents at the bottom 25% of the
7

Briefly, the responses to stated preference questions are sensitive to scope when they imply that people are
prepared to pay more for a larger quantity of the good to be valued or a broader, more comprehensive policy
package.
8
In 2014 PPS, these figures are 132.81 € (s.e. 14.30). The 2014 PPS equivalents are obtained through dividing the
Czech crowns by 16.3563 and multiplying the Italy Euro by 1.02 (based on Eurostat 2014 data).
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distribution of income in the sample, for whom it is about 62% greater than the rest of the
sample. In practice, this means that the WTP is on average 160.92 Euro per ton of CO2 emissions
reduced (164.14 2014 PPS Euro), and that there is considerable heterogeneity in the sample,
depending on income. The WTP is on average 182.92 € (s.e. 52.49) for those respondents who
report their income, 67.02 € (s.e. 12.23) for those with income at the bottom 25% of the
distribution of income in the sample, 228.86 € (s.e. 66.24) for persons with income equal to or
greater than the top 25%, and only 39.10 € (s.e. 27.18) for those respondents who decline to
report their income. (In 2014 PPS, these WTP figures are 174.32, 68.36, 233.44, and 39.88,
respectively.)
As shown in Section 3, the income elasticity likewise depend on income, and is
increasing in income as long as the marginal utility of emissions reductions is increasing in
income (i.e., 1 is positive and the marginal utility of income is not increasing with income). We
find that with this RUM specification it ranges from 0.51 to 0.89, for an average of 0.72. This is
less than one, but not very far from one. Indeed, a simple calculation shows that the ratio
between the WTP at the bottom and top 25% incomes is 0.29, and the ratio of the averages
income within the first and fourth quartile is 0.35, suggesting an income elasticity of WTP
slightly higher than one (about 1.15).
We attempted a model based on the RUM in equation (6), but found no evidence that the
marginal utility of emissions reductions is quadratic in income. We also tried a mixed logit
model that allowed all coefficients except for the marginal utility of income to be random
variables, but found little evidence that parameters are random variables (with the only exception
on the parameter on the carbon tax dummy).
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B. Czech Republic
The results for the Czech Republic are striking. Much like the Italians, the Czechs favor
renewable-oriented policies over energy efficiency, support emissions reductions, and are
opposed to a carbon tax, although not quite with the same intensity as the Italians (table 6, panel
(B)). All else the same, more expensive policies are judged less attractive, yielding a positive and
significant marginal utility of income. Interactions between policy instruments do not improve
the fit of the model.
The WTP per ton from the simplest model (the one in equation (1), and table 6, panel
(B)) is 93.83 € (2014 PPS €). Could this figure be predicted using the WTP from the Italy
sample, if adjustments were made for the different incomes? For people who report their income,
the WTP per ton is 97.5 and 146.88 € (2014 PPS) for the Czech and Italian samples,
respectively. The WTP ratio is thus 1.51. The average incomes are 20,351 and 30,789 € (2014
PPS), respectively, for an income ratio of 1.51. The implied income elasticity of WTP is thus
exactly 1. This means that the WTP is strictly proportional to the income ratio between the two
samples.
We would, however, arrive at a completely different conclusion if we had relied on the
income elasticity of the WTP within each country’s sample. The models of table 8 imply that the
income elasticity of WTP in the Czech Republic sample is on average 0.35 in one specification
and 0.46 in the other. Had we used Italy’s WTP figure but the Czech Republic’s income
elasticity, which is very low, we would have overestimated the Czechs’ WTP. Using the
estimates from model (A) of table 7 and 8, we would have predicted the Czechs’ WTP to be 124
2014 PPS € per ton, when the direct estimate is 97.50 €. Had we used Italy’s WTP and income
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elasticity, we would have still overestimated the Czech WTP, but this time by less than 9 €
(predicted 106 € v. direct 97.50 €).
In sharp contrast with the Italy sample, in the Czech sample the marginal utility of
income actually appears to be greater for wealthier persons and the marginal utility of emissions
reductions grows only weakly with income. The net effect, based on the results in table 8, panel
(B), is that the average WTP per ton in the Czech sample is 93.85 2014 PPS Euro, and that there
is a difference of only 9 PPS Euro between the WTP of persons in the bottom 25% of the
distribution of income (95.24€ PPS) and in the top 25% of the distribution of income (104.85 €
PPS). The WTP for persons that report their income is 101.83€ PPS (s.e. 11.56), that of persons
who do not report their income 45.96 2014 € PPS (s.e. 17.58).
When we fit the conditional logit corresponding to the RUM of equation (6), we do find
some evidence that the marginal utility of emissions reductions is quadratic in income for the
Czechs. This model results in an even lower income elasticity of WTP—only 0.22. As for
evidence that the coefficients are random, our mixed logit estimation results suggest that, much
like for Italy, the one parameter that appears to be random, and to have a considerable amount of
variation across the sample, is the one on the carbon tax attribute.

6. Discussion and Conclusions
We have used a standardized stated preference survey, which we administered on-line to
a sample of homeowners in Italy and a sample that is representative of the population for
geography, age, education and income in the Czech Republic, to answer three key research
questions: First, what is the WTP per ton of CO2 emissions reduced by a public program?
Second, is this WTP reasonable? Third, how does income influence the WTP per ton?
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We have found that the WTP for each ton of CO2 emissions reductions delivered by
public programs is 130 – 161 Euro (133 - 164 2014 PPS Euro) in Italy, depending on the model
specification, and 94 2014 PPS Euro in the Czech Republic. These figures are reasonable when
compared with estimates from other stated preference studies, in the sense that they fall roughly
in the middle of the range of figures reported in these other studies. Our WTP figures are greater
than those in the 2014 study by Diederich and Goeschl (6.30 Euro per ton) and smaller than the
332 Euro per ton from policies that promote energy efficiency in the Basque country (Longo et
al., 2012) or the $967 (2005 $) from renewable energy programs in the Bath area in the UK
(Longo et al., 2008).
We took great care to provide a context that respondents could relate to, and for this
reason we chose residential energy consumption and household-level emissions. Our emissions
reductions were expressed in both tons and as a percentage of the baseline, which was common
across the two countries and was 5 tons CO2 per year per household. This approach is in sharp
contrast with others that have expressed the emissions reductions as (very small) percentage of
Kyoto-agreed national target (Longo et al., 2008; Longo et al., 2012). We also set the time
horizon for emissions reductions and payments at 10 years.
An alternative way to answer our second research question is to examine whether the
responses were consistent with economic theory and whether respondents were sensitive to
certain attributes of the policy packages in a manner similar to that reported in earlier studies.
The results from our econometric models indicate that respondents were sensitive to scope (i.e.,
they were willing to pay more for greater emissions reductions) and, all else the same, less
inclined to choose a more expensive policy package. They also indicated a preference for how
the emissions reductions are delivered: They were opposed to a carbon tax (although in the
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Czech Republic with less intensity than in Italy) and favored renewable energy over energy
efficiency goals.
Finally, we found that the marginal utility of emissions reductions does increase with the
respondent’s household income, but the marginal utility of income varies with income in
opposite directions in the two countries. In the Italy study, the marginal utility of income is
higher among poorer households, while in the Czech Republic it appears to be higher among
wealthier households. The net result is that the WTP grows with income in both samples, but
much less so in the Czech Republic sample, where people at the bottom and top 25% of the
distribution of income hold WTP amounts that are only 8 Euro apart. The income elasticities of
WTP were low in the Czech Republic and about 0.7 in the Italy sample—but a direct “benefit
transfer” from one country to the other implied an income elasticity of WTP of one. This
suggests to us that an income elasticity of one might be a reasonable choice in many benefit
transfer and integrated assessment modeling applications.
Finally, and perhaps even more important, Alberini and Bigano (2015) find that, based on
a survey sample that largely overlaps with the sample of Italian respondents in this paper, the
cost-effectiveness of residential energy efficiency policies is of the order of 279 Euro per ton of
CO2 emissions reduced. The existing residential energy efficiency program in Italy attains CO2
emissions reductions at a cost per ton that is similar, or even higher (ENEA, 2009, 2015)
suggesting that the current policy is much more expensive than what Italian households would be
prepared to pay.
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Figure 1. Example of Choice Card used in the survey in the Czech Republic.
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Table 1. Summary of attributes and attribute levels used in the conjoint choice experiments.
Number
levels

Attribute

Attribute levels

goal of the policy

energy efficiency, renewables

2

mechanism(s)

incentives, regulation, taxes on fossil fuels, informationbased approaches

7

reduction in CO2 emissions
0.25 tons (5%), 0.50 tons (10%), 1 ton (20%), 1.65 (33%)
(for each of 10 years)

4

cost to the household for 25, 50, 100, 300 Euro (Italy)
each of 10 years
400, 800, 2000, 5000 Czech crowns (Czech Republic)
number of possible profiles

of

4
224

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the respondents, percent or sample mean.
Variable
Gender
Male
Education
high school diploma
college degree
Master's or PhD
Income
After-tax
annual
household
income
(nominal, 2014 local currency or PPS €)
Mean
Median
Bottom 25% of distribution of income,
mean (exact 25th percentile)
Top 25% of distribution of income,
mean (exact 75th percentile)
Missing income (refused)

Italy

Czech Republic

61.59%

49.35%

47.78%
26.47%
7.16%

35.72%
4.23%
9.90%

€30,185
€27,500
€14,024
(€17,500)
€40,165
(€37,500)
12.54%

CZK 332,865 [PPS €20,351]
CZK 321,012 [PPS €19,626]
CZK 152,000 [PPS €9,290]
CZK 204,000 [PPS €20,351]
CZK 538,000 [PPS €32,894]
CZK 390,000 [PPS €23,845]
10.62%
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Table 3. Respondents’ opinions about climate change. Percent of the sample that select each
rating score.
(A) Italy

2

Neutral
3

4

Completely
Agree
5

12.14

10.45

32.34

27.46

17.61

2.29

5.47

25.17

36.82

30.25

1.69

5.07

29.15

36.72

27.36

1.69

5.47

29.75

35.02

28.06

1.49

5.97

33.33

37.61

21.59

Climate change doesn't exist

58.61

12.44

18.81

6.97

3.18

Actually, the Earth is globally cooling

27.96

18.51

39.5

9.25

4.78

I have never heard of climate change before

64.18

9.15

16.52

7.76

2.39

Completely
disagree
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Completely
Agree
5

14.44

11.70

42.53

19.93

11.41

3.83

8.59

35.74

32.06

19.98

9.68

14.15

40.87

22.96

12.35

3.68

6.64

38.99

30.97

19.71

4.26

9.75

46.14

26.79

13.07

Climate change doesn't exist

37.98

21.44

27.51

8.45

4.62

Actually, the Earth is globally cooling

15.38

16.97

43.31

11.70

6.64

I have never heard of climate change before

48.75

19.35

19.78

6.35

6.56

The greenhouse effect is caused by a hole in the
atmosphere
Climate change is caused by excessive greenhouse
gas emissions
Climate change means that in the future the Earth
will be warmer
Carbon dioxide is one of the most important
greenhouse gases
Burning fossil fuels is the most important cause of
greenhouse gases

Completely
disagree
1

(B) Czech Republic

The greenhouse effect is caused by a hole in the
atmosphere
Climate change is caused by excessive greenhouse
gas emissions
Climate change means that in the future the Earth
will be warmer
Carbon dioxide is one of the most important
greenhouse gases
Burning fossil fuels is the most important cause of
greenhouse gases
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Table 4. Policy Choices made by the Respondents.
Italy
response

Freq.

Czech Republic

Percent

Freq.

Percent

policy A

1

1,992

39.64

2301

33.23

policy B

2

1,869

37.19

2500

36.10

status quo

3

1,164

23.16

2124

30.67

Total

5,025

100

6,925

100.00
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Table 5. Responses by pair.
(A) Italy
response
Pair
1
2
3
4
5
Total

3 =
1 = Policy A 2 = Policy B Quo
427
354
42.49
35.22
359
414
35.72
41.19
377
402
37.51
40
406
367
40.4
36.52
423
332
42.09
33.03
1,992
1,869
39.64
37.19

Status
Total
224
22.29
232
23.08
226
22.49
232
23.08
250
24.88
1,164
23.16

1,005
100
1,005
100
1,005
100
1,005
100
1,005
100
5,025
100

(B) Czech Republic
response
Pair
1
2
3
4
5
Total

3 =
1 = Policy A 2 = Policy B Quo
523
476
37.76
34.37
433
511
31.26
36.90
405
539
29.24
38.92
440
528
31.77
38.12
500
446
36.10
32.20
2301
2500
33.23
36.10

Status
Total
386
27.87
441
31.84
441
31.84
417
30.11
439
31.70
2124
30.67

1,385
100
1,385
100
1,385
100
1,385
100
1,385
100
6,925
100
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Table 6. Conditional logit model. Dep. var.: Policy Choice. Full samples. Standard errors
clustered at the individual respondent level.
Italy
energy efficiency
Renewables
Incentives
Standards
Tax
Info
CO2
Cost
No obs.
No ID
Log likelihood
LR test of the null that
all coefficients are zero
P value

Coeff
0.3490
0.5425
0.2919
0.1191
-0.1382
0.1390
0.4292
-0.0033

t stat
3.84
5.96
3.98
1.61
-3.19
1.82
11.28
-15.98

Czech Republic
Coeff
t stat
0.1278
1.42
0.2025
2.28
0.2131
3.36
0.1605
2.53
-0.0411
-0.98
0.1341
2.00
0.3758
11.02
-0.00024
-18.15

15,075
1,005
-5,157.17

20,910
1,394
-7289.83

726.71
0.0000

727.06
0.0000
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Table 7. Conditional logit model with marginal utilities of emissions reductions and income
that depend on income: Italy. Standard errors clustered at the individual respondent level.
(A)
energy efficiency
Renewables
Incentives
Standards
Tax
Info
CO2
CO2 x HINC (10,000)
Cost
cost x QRT1
cost x QRT4
cost x MISSINC
income elasticity,
mean (s.d.)
No obs.
No ID
LogLik
Wald chi square
Pseudo R2

Coeff
0.3543
0.5568
0.2880
0.1174
-0.1362
0.1408
0.1043
0.1240
-0.0033

0.744
(0.099)
15,075
1,005
-5,124
341.39
0.072

(B)
t stat
3.25
5.12
3.90
1.56
-2.90
1.76
1.34
4.77
-13.31

Coeff
0.3589
0.5612
0.2879
0.1168
-0.1356
0.1402
0.1139
0.1190
-0.0026
-0.0016
-0.0006
-0.0003
0.722
(0.104)
15,075
1,005
-5,119
345.62
0.073

t stat
3.30
5.17
3.90
1.56
-2.89
1.75
1.44
4.56
-3.63
-1.86
-0.73
-0.34
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Table 8. Conditional logit model with marginal utilities of emissions reductions and income
that depend on income: Czech Republic. Standard errors clustered at the individual respondent
level.

(A)
energy efficiency
Renewables
Incentives
Standards
Tax
Info
CO2
CO2 x HINC(10,000)
Cost
cost x QRT1
cost x QRT4
cost x MISSINC
income elasticity,
mean (s.d.)
No obs.
No ID
LogLik
Wald chi square
Pseudo R2

Coeff
0.1287
0.2031
0.2144
0.1600
-0.0410
0.1350
0.2487
0.0512
-0.0002

0.346
(0.108)
20,910
1,394
-7,284
429.25
0.049

(B)
t stat
1.43
2.28
3.38
2.52
-0.97
2.01
3.40
1.99
-18.14

Coeff
0.1271
0.2031
0.2163
0.1615
-0.0424
0.1369
0.2025
0.0703
-0.0002
0.0001
-0.0001
0.0000
0.464
(0.122)
20,910
1,394
-7,274
437.50
0.050

t stat
1.42
2.28
3.40
2.54
-1.00
2.04
2.81
2.76
-12.25
1.59
-1.91
-0.74
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Table 9. Summary of WTP figures.
(A) Italy. Nominal 2014 Euro in regular typeface. 2014 PPS Euro in boldface. Standard errors in
parentheses. 2014 PPS Euro are obtained by multiplying nominal 2014 Euro by 1.02.
WTP per ton…

Model (A) of table 7

Model (B) of table 7

Income not reported

31.48
(23.37)

32.11
(23.84)

39.10
(27.18)

39.88
(27.72)

Income reported

144.01
(15.54)

146.89
(15.85)

182.92
(52.49)

186.58
(53.54)

129.90
(14.53)

132.50
(14,82)

160.92
(41.93)

164.14
(42.77)

Bottom 25% income
(subsample mean)

83.76
(15.77)

85.43
(16.08)

67.02
(12.23)

68.36
(12.47)

Top 25% income
(subsample mean)

181.22
(8.88)

184.84
(9.06)

228.86
(66.24)

233.44
(67.56)

All

Model of table 6

130.21
(14.02)

132.81
(14.30)

(B) Czech Republic. Nominal 2014 Czech crowns in regular typeface. 2014 PPS Euro in
boldface. Standard errors in parentheses. 2014 PPS Euro are obtained by dividing nominal 2014
Czech crowns by 16.3563.
WTP per ton…

Model (A) of table 7

Model (B) of table 7

Income not reported

1015.35
(302.36)

62.06
(18.48)

751.74
(287.54)

45.96
(17.58)

Income reported

1,595.38
(157.09)

97.50
(9.60)

1,665.56
(189.14)

101.80
(11.56)

1,533.80
(163.07)

93.74
(9.97)

1,535.04
(165.20)

93.85
(10.10)

Bottom 25% income
(subsample mean)

1,280.12
(199.33)

78.26
(12.19)

1,557.81
(313.29)

95.24
(19.15)

Top 25% income
(subsample mean)

1,952.88
(262.30)

119.40
(16.04)

1,714.98
(236.28)

104.85
(14.45)

All

Model of table 6

1,535.33
(153.04)

93.83
(9.35)
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